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- DEK, KEK and Master key - Information Security Stack Exchange
This article is intended to be a simplified explanation sans drill-down for people wanting to understand these concepts terms What are DEK, KEK and MEK Master key?
- encryption - Why not use the KEK directly to encrypt data . . .
The DEK never changes: you don't want to re-encrypt every single file, so you don't change the DEK You may want to change the KEK: if your KEK expires, got compromised, or you transfer ownership of the data to someone, you can re-encrypt the DEK with another key
- How do SED drives generate the DEK? - Information Security Stack Exchange
The DEK is used to encrypt all content on the drive In the case the drive needs to be securely wiped, the DEK can simply be erased, regardless of whether or not the AK is set According to the TCG, the DEK is generated on the drive itself, rather than being generated on the computer and transferred over through some vendor-specific ATA command:
- Hierarchical Key Rotation. Should I rotate the lowest level keys?
Ultimately, your DEK is the critical one - if someone has your data and your DEK then it is game over Moreover, if someone has access to your data and the DEK then rotating all the other keys won't matter Still, only you can decide whether or not it is worth the effort to rotate the DEK Hence the question: what is your threat model?
- cryptography - Exchange of DEK and KEK (encryption keys) between app . . .
To make the system more secure, instead of storing DEK in plain text in the app server, it is stored in encrypted form (en_dek) in the app server The key to encrypt the DEK is stored in a totally separate server and is called the Key Encryption Key (KEK)
- encryption - How to decrypt the Encrypted DEK using KEK which are . . .
Decrypting the DEK using KEK under PCI-Standards, which are separated by Servers: Let say for example we have server1 and server2 Server1: It is in East US, called it as Application Server Host
- Can AWS KMS be used for both KEK and DEK for PCI DSS?
There's nothing within the PCI DSS which would prevent you from using AWS KMS for both the KEK and the DEK You should ensure you're generating strong keys, the KEK is equivalent strength to the DEK (e g both AES 256-bit), the DEK is encrypted by the KEK and you have separate key custodians for key components
- disk encryption - How is the DEK in a SED drive encrypted . . .
The DEK is then encrypted again, using a password provided by me An attacker with access to the disk could theoretically extract the (encrypted) DEK from the drive
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